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Blame and the Criminal Law‡ 
 
David Lefkowitz, University of Richmond 
 
The retributivist dream, as I will construe it, is to create a world in 
which impositions of criminal liability and punishment correspond to our 
considered judgments of blame and desert. To characterize this aspiration 
somewhat differently, a given jurisdiction is regarded as just—more 
precisely, as conforming to the principle of retributive justice—when its 
penal law imposes liability only on those persons who are blameworthy, 
and inflicts punishments only on those persons who deserve them—in 
proportion to their blame and desert.1 
As the above quotation indicates, legal philosophers who adopt a retributivist 
approach to analysing and evaluating the criminal law commonly understand criminal 
proceedings as an effort to identify and respond to blameworthy violations of the 
criminal law.2  In doing so, they appear to presume that the same concept of blame that 
figures in our interpersonal moral relationships also figures in the criminal law, with the 
practice of blaming in these two realms distinguished only by the agents who do the 
blaming and the norms the violation of which justifies their doing so.  In short, criminal 
                                                        
‡ Published in Jurisprudence 6:3 (2015): 451-469. 
1 Douglas Husak, ““Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream,” (2011-2012) 9 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 449. 
2 Those who share Husak’s retributivist dream, broadly speaking, include Michael Moore, 
Placing Blame (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); R. A. Duff, Punishment, 
Communication, and Community (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Larry 
Alexander, Kimberley Ferzan, and Stephen Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Mitchell N. Berman, “Rehabilitating 
Retributivism,” (2012) 32(1) Law and Philosophy 83. 
blame is of a piece with moral blame, and to judge someone criminally blameworthy is 
to judge her morally blameworthy.  
 David Shoemaker thinks this presumption mistaken.3  He argues that on what he 
takes to be the most plausible account of moral blame currently available, namely the 
one developed by T. M. Scanlon, criminal blame cannot be understood as an instance of 
moral blame.  Whereas for Scanlon moral blame is a response to the meaning of an 
agent’s wrongdoing, criminal blame, which Shoemaker equates with legal punishment, 
is a response only to the impermissibility of the agent’s conduct.4  The different 
conceptions of blame operative in the interpersonal and criminal realms reflect the 
different fundamental functions they serve, functions that entail in turn different 
relationships between blamer and blamed.  If successful, Shoemaker’s argument 
provides many legal philosophers with a compelling reason to revise their 
understanding of what it is to hold a person criminally responsible.5  What is at stake 
may not be merely whether we employ a single or two (or more) concepts of 
blameworthiness and blame, though that seems a question worthy of investigation in its 
own right.  Rather, Shoemaker’s argument may also pose a challenge to retributivism 
                                                        
3 David Shoemaker, “Blame and Punishment,” in D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), 
Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 100-18. 
4 Note that punishment is not the only blaming response the state may make to a criminal 
offender.  For example, subsequent to her conviction the judge presiding over a criminal trial 
may deliver an angry lecture to the offender that explicitly calls her attention to the meaning of 
her criminal act.  Moreover, the very act of convicting a defendant may convey censure; i.e. it 
may constitute a blaming response and not simply a judgment of blameworthiness.  For 
purposes of this paper, however, I focus exclusively on the law’s use of punishment to respond 
to criminal conduct. 
5 Alternatively these legal theorists might reject Scanlon’s account of blame, though Shoemaker 
suggests that his arguments likely pose a strong challenge to any attempt to construct a unified 
account of blame (see Shoemaker (n 3) 118).    
insofar its defenders rely implicitly or explicitly on judgments of blame and 
blameworthiness in interpersonal contexts to motivate, elaborate, or substantiate their 
theories of punishment.  If successful, Shoemaker’s argument entails that such 
inferences are unwarranted; we ought not to rely on either the theory or practice of 
moral blame in an interpersonal context to make sense of or to justify the criminal law’s 
practices of trial and punishment.6    
 In what follows I seek both to rebut Shoemaker’s arguments and to offer a 
preliminary defence of the claim that when justified legal punishment is necessarily a 
response to a criminal’s moral blameworthiness, understood in Scanlonian terms.7  I 
begin in section I with criticisms of Shoemaker’s argument that the criminal trial’s focus 
on what the accused did – that is, whether she committed a criminal offense (in the 
absence of a defence) – demonstrates that the grounds for criminal blame, or legal 
punishment, is solely the impermissibility of her conduct and not its meaning.  
Specifically, I argue that the trial phase of a criminal proceeding might just as well be 
understood as an attempt to determine indirectly whether the defendant is morally 
blameworthy for criminal conduct by eliminating reasons to think she is not, before 
                                                        
6 Shoemaker targets inferences in the opposite direction; ie reliance on the theory and practice 
of holding people criminally responsible to make sense of blame in interpersonal contexts.  See 
Shoemaker (n 3) 100. 
7 While moral blameworthiness is a necessary condition for just punishment, I argue elsewhere 
that a just criminal legal system may factor in to a limited degree considerations of deterrence 
when calculating the appropriate magnitude or type of punishment.  To the extent that it does 
so, punishment will not serve solely to communicate blame nor engage its target as a moral 
agent, a point I briefly expand on in the third section of this paper.  There is a sense, then, in 
which blame may provide only part of the justification for particular acts of punishment.  This 
does not undermine the thesis defended here, however, namely that punishment is justifiable 
only if it a response to an agent’s moral blameworthiness.  See Author, ----; Andrew Von Hirsch, 
Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).  
proceeding (if necessary) at the sentencing phase to determine how much blame she 
merits for her criminal wrongdoing.  I also illustrate how Shoemaker’s narrow focus on 
the trial phase of a criminal proceeding blinds him to the possibility that the criminal 
proceeding as a whole constitutes a response to moral blameworthiness.  In section II I 
rebut four criticisms Shoemaker levels against the view that a just, or at least a 
legitimate, criminal law should punish offenders for their failure to act with sufficient or 
proper regard for others’ legally protected interests.  As I explain below, blame is a 
response to a failure of proper regard; thus a defence of the claim that just legal 
punishment is a response to a failure of proper regard amounts to a defence of the 
claim that criminal blame is of a piece with (or an instance of) moral blame.  My 
responses to Shoemaker focus largely on his failure to give due consideration to law’s 
legitimate authority – both it’s claim to it and its actual enjoyment of it – and his 
conflation of two separate claims, one regarding what the law may justly demand of its 
subjects and one regarding what it may justly do, all things considered, to those who fail 
to meet its demands.  In the third and final section I critique Shoemaker’s argument for 
the existence of two conceptions of blame, one operative in the interpersonal realm and 
the other in the criminal realm, distinguished by the different functions they serve.  
Instead, I attribute the differences we see in the practice of blaming in these two realms 
to the extent or degree to which we employ responses other than blame, especially 
conditional threats, in our efforts to bring others to conform to the norms that define or 
specify our relationship to them.    
I 
In order to assess the truth of Shoemaker’s claim that criminal blame is not 
merely an instance of moral blame, we first need to understand the nature of 
(Scanlonian) moral blame and of legal punishment.  
Scanlon takes blame to be a response to a judgment of blameworthiness.  To say 
that an action is blameworthy, he writes, ‘is to make a claim about its meaning: to claim 
that the action indicates something about the agent’s attitudes that impairs his or her 
relations with others.’8  Scanlon understands the agent’s attitude to others to be 
constituted by her reasons for acting as she did and the fact that certain other 
considerations did not count for her as reasons against so acting.9  As I understand the 
view, then, to judge a person morally blameworthy is to judge that she failed to respond 
appropriately to one or more of the norms that specify or define a relationship she 
bears to one or more others (or, possibly, herself).  What these norms specify or define 
is what counts as proper or appropriate regard for the others to whom a person stands 
in a particular relationship.  Adherence to a norm that defines one’s relationship to 
another involves treating it as a reason to act or feel, or not act or feel, in certain ways 
at certain times in certain contexts, etc.  Thus to judge a person morally blameworthy is 
to conclude that she failed to respond properly to reasons for acting and/or feeling that 
apply to her in virtue of her standing in a particular relationship to others.   
To blame someone, Scanlon writes, is to ‘judge him or her to be blameworthy 
and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment 
                                                        
8 T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008) 6. 
9 Ibid, 152-3. 
of impaired relations holds to be appropriate.’10  What sort of modification is called for, 
or what counts as an appropriate response to a judgment of blameworthiness, will vary 
depending on the particular relationship in question (and perhaps other considerations 
as well).  What matters for our purposes here is that blame is a response to a judgment 
of blameworthiness, and on Scanlon’s account judgments of blameworthiness track a 
person’s reasons for acting as she did.  Those reasons give the person’s act its meaning.  
As for legal punishment, Shoemaker cites Antony Duff’s characterization of it as ‘the 
imposition of something that is intended to be burdensome or painful, on a supposed 
offender for a supposed crime, by a person or body who claims the authority to do so.’11 
Though Shoemaker acknowledges certain similarities between moral 
blameworthiness and moral blame on the one hand, and criminal blameworthiness and 
criminal blame (which, again, he equates with legal punishment) on the other, he 
contends that the former differs fundamentally from the latter.  Specifically, Shoemaker 
argues that moral blameworthiness tracks only the meaning of a person’s action – his 
reasons for acting as he did – while criminal blameworthiness tracks only the 
impermissibility of an agent’s action.  While a person may be morally blameworthy for 
performing a permissible act if she does so for the wrong reason(s), Shoemaker writes: 
‘one could never be punishment-worthy for performing a criminally permissible action; 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 128-9. 
11 See Shoemaker (n 3) 5.  In a recent update to the article Shoemaker cites, Duff replaces the 
phrase ‘the imposition of something that is intended to be burdensome or painful’ with the 
phrase ‘the imposition of something that is intended to be both burdensome and reprobative’ 
(Duff, “Legal Punishment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (revised May 2013), Edward 
N. Zalta, ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/.  
one’s conduct has to be illegal for one to deserve punishment,’ but ‘one is punishment-
worthy for performing a criminally impermissible action alone, regardless of the 
meaning of that action.’12  If Shoemaker correctly identifies the respective targets of 
moral and criminal blame, and if these different targets are indeed essential features of 
these responses to (perceived) violations of norms that define specific relationships, 
then it follows that criminal blame is not an instance of moral blame. 
Consider, first, Shoemaker’s defence of the claim that agents warrant legal 
punishment solely for their criminally impermissible conduct, not their reasons for 
violating the criminal law.13  In determining whether a person accused of a particular 
crime ought to be punished, Shoemaker argues that the state investigates only whether 
she committed a criminal offense without a defence, not her reasons for doing so.  He 
grants that the court may consider a defendant’s reasons for acting as she did when it 
considers whether she has a legal defence for her violation of criminal law; for example, 
if those reasons show that her action was done under duress.  As Shoemaker 
emphasizes, however, defences function to preclude conviction, ‘whereas defendants 
are ultimately held criminally responsible only for offenses, and these are responses 
solely to impermissible conduct… not meaning.’14  Thus Shoemaker concludes that 
                                                        
12 See Shoemaker (n 3) 103-4. 
13 I offer a rebuttal to Shoemaker’s other claim, namely that one could never be punishment-
worthy for performing a legally permissible action, in the next section.  To anticipate, one can 
indeed be punishment-worthy, i.e. deserve punishment, for performing a criminally permissible 
action if one does so for the wrong reasons, but practical concerns may well provide compelling 
grounds for largely limiting legal punishment (as well as criminal investigation and prosecution) 
to those instances in which agents perform criminal acts. 
14 See Shoemaker (n 3) 104. 
‘criminal impermissibility [offense without defence] delivers grounds for punishment,’ 
which entails that ‘the grounds for punishment are delivered precisely without the sort 
of meaning Scanlon takes to be essential to blame.’15 
I contend that Shoemaker fails to recognize a plausible alternative construal of 
the purpose served by the trial phase in a criminal proceeding.  On this account, the trial 
phase does not deliver the grounds for punishment; rather, the purpose of a criminal 
trial is to investigate the various reasons why the defendant may not be morally 
blameworthy for the criminal offense with which the prosecution charges him.  These 
include the prosecutor’s failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the offense in question, and the defendant’s successfully demonstrating that 
though he committed the offense his act was justified or excused.  Absent these 
reasons, however, the state justifiably concludes that the accused merits moral blame; 
i.e. that its initial judgment of blameworthiness as expressed in its accusation or charge 
of wrongdoing stands.  Whatever the offender’s particular reasons for committing the 
offense may turn out to be, a question that may be and sometimes is taken up at the 
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, those reasons constitute an attitude that 
impairs her relationship to others, i.e. to her victim(s) and, in a legitimate state, to all 
members of the political community whose law she violates as such.  In terms I defend 
later in this paper against Shoemaker’s criticisms, the state concludes that the 
defendant failed to act with sufficient regard for one or more of another’s legally 
protected interests, and that it therefore has a sufficient reason to investigate further 
                                                        
15 Ibid, 104-5. 
(often at the sentencing phase) to determine the extent to which she failed to do so.  In 
short, a criminal trial does not establish that the accused is morally blameworthy 
directly by investigating his or her reasons for acting as she is accused of acting, i.e. the 
meaning of her act.  Instead, it establishes that a person is morally blameworthy 
indirectly by eliminating all those considerations that entail that a person is not at all 
blameworthy for performing the act in question.  Absent any of these considerations the 
state takes itself to have good reason to stand by its initial judgment that the defendant 
is morally blameworthy for criminal conduct, and to devote the resources necessary to 
determine the degree of blame and the specific type of blaming response the offender 
warrants for her unjustified and unexcused violation of the law.  
The suggestion that the point of a criminal trial is to establish the absence of any 
reason to revise the preliminary judgment of blameworthiness expressed in the criminal 
charge may seem at odds with the presumption of innocence; ie the principle that the 
law bears the burden of proof when it comes to establishing a defendant’s criminal guilt.  
The conflict is merely apparent, however.  The presumption of innocence does not 
speak to the aim of trial, eg whether it is to establish merely that the defendant acted 
impermissibly or that he is morally blameworthy.  Rather, it constitutes the evidentiary 
standard the law must meet in making its case regardless of whether that case is rightly 
understood as demonstrating that the defendant acted impermissibly or is 
blameworthy.  The concern to protect innocent subjects from legal officials who might 
mistakenly misuse or deliberately abuse their powers (not only of prosecution but also 
investigation), or the judgment that the punishment of the innocent is generally morally 
worse than the failure to punish the guilty, or both, likely provide the most plausible 
justification for the burden of proof.  If so, then the justifiability of employing the 
presumption of innocence does not depend on the aim of the criminal trial, and is 
comptabile with both Shoemaker’s and my own depiction of it. 
In defending his claim that criminal blame is a response to the impermissibility of 
an agent’s act and not its meaning Shoemaker considers separate suggestions by Victor 
Tadros and Scanlon that the mens rea component of many criminal offense definitions 
reveals that the state does care about the accused’s reasons for violating the law even 
at the trial phase of a criminal proceeding.  Scanlon, for instance, maintains: ‘distinctions 
between various crimes, such as manslaughter, first degree murder, and second degree 
murder are a matter of the agent’s attitudes.  This strongly suggests to me that criminal 
penalties are, among other things, expressions of blame [in] the sense I describe.’16  
Shoemaker responds that mens rea serves only to distinguish different types of criminal 
offenses (e.g. different grades of criminal killing) that have the same actus reus for the 
purpose of establishing which offense in particular to attribute to the accused.  Mens 
rea speaks to what the defendant did (or is accused of doing), not why he did it.17  It is 
the latter, however, that provides the action’s meaning, and which is the proper target 
of moral blame.  Given the account I set out above of the function served by the trial 
                                                        
16 T.M. Scanlon, at 9:51 a.m., 5/19/11, on 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2011/05/scanlon-on-blame-part-3-criminal-blame-and-
meaning.html#tp.  
17 In other words, Shoemaker maintains that the criminal law employs only what Joshua Dressler 
labels the narrow or elemental meaning of mens rea, not the broad, culpability, meaning that is 
the heart of the retributivist’s dream.  See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 6th 
Edition (New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), 118-9. 
phase of a criminal proceeding, I need not contest Shoemaker’s argument that 
investigations into the defendant’s mens rea do not concern her reasons for action.  
Nevertheless, I raise his discussion of it here because I believe his exclusive focus on the 
trial phase results in an incomplete analysis of criminal blame, whereas a fuller picture 
lends support to the view that it is but an instance of moral blame. 
Legal systems often attach different punishments or punishment ranges to the 
different degrees or grades of criminal killing.  For example, conviction for murder 
typically carries with it the possibility of a greater punishment than does conviction for 
manslaughter.  One plausible explanation for why legal systems do this is that they 
presume that murder is more blameworthy than is manslaughter; all else equal a person 
who kills with ‘malice aforethought’ or ‘wilful disregard’ reveals a more reprehensible 
attitude toward his or her victim than does a person who kills in the absence of either 
condition.18  If we ask only about what the state aims to investigate at the trial phase of 
a criminal proceeding, we will find that the state does not care what motivated the 
criminal act (i.e. the criminal act’s meaning).  Asking only this question, however, leaves 
it unclear why the state cares whether the accused killed with or without malice 
aforethought or wilful disregard.  A plausible answer to this question is that whatever 
their particular reasons for committing a criminal killing, the state (and people 
generally) judges people who do so with malice aforethought or wilful disregard to be 
more blameworthy than those who does so without.  Suppose A’s reason for attacking B 
is the same as C’s reason for attacking D; say the victims each poured a beer over their 
                                                        
18 See Alexander et al (n 2) 284. 
assailants’ heads.  If A deliberately intends to kill B while C does not, then in the event 
that both A and C kill their victims the state (and people generally) may judge A to have 
acted with even less regard for B’s legally protected interest than it judges C to have 
acted with regard for D’s legally protected interest.  If so, then the fact that A receives a 
stiffer punishment than does C in light of the fact that A is convicted for murder while C 
is found guilty of manslaughter entails that the state’s concern with mens rea can be 
grounded in its aim of punishing in line with an offender’s moral blameworthiness.  This 
connection becomes clear, however, only when we expand our examination to include 
both the trial and sentencing phases of a criminal proceeding. 
II. 
Thus far I have sought to challenge Shoemaker’s argument that criminal blame, 
ie punishment, is solely a response to the criminal impermissibility of a defendant’s 
conduct.  I have suggested to the contrary that in many jurisdictions the criminal law 
(rightly) aims to punish offenders in response to their moral blameworthiness.  Moral 
blameworthiness, however, tracks the meaning of an agent’s conduct: to hold a person 
morally blameworthy is to judge that she failed to act with appropriate regard for 
others, where what counts as appropriate regard is determined (albeit with more or less 
specificity) by the norms that define her relationship to another.  Thus if the criminal law 
punishes offenders at least in part in response to judgments of their moral 
blameworthiness, it punishes them for their failure to act with appropriate regard for 
others as determined by the norms that define their relationship to one another qua 
subjects of a common criminal law.  Or, to use a phrase I employed earlier in this paper, 
the criminal law punishes offenders at least in part for their failure to act with 
appropriate or sufficient regard for others’ legally protected interest(s).19 
Shoemaker levels several criticisms against the claim that ‘the reasons against 
breaching the criminal law… boil down to paying insufficient regard to the interests of 
others.’20  First, he maintains that sufficient regard ‘is too vague to be a realistic target 
of criminal investigation in criminal trials,’ with no non-arbitrary solution to the question 
of what counts as sufficient regard.21  This complaint is rather ironic, since one of the 
main functions the criminal law serves is to render more determinate various moral 
prohibitions, a task it performs by authoritatively determining the sort of regard people 
ought to have for one another qua moral agents in various types of relationships (eg 
“bare” subjects of a common legal system, parties to a legal contract, co-executors of an 
estate, parent and child, etc.).  References to agents’ legally protected interests, then, 
are references to the law’s judgment regarding agents’ interests and the kind of 
setbacks to or promotions of those interests its subjects may, must, or must not 
perform.  Of course the criminal law’s specifications of sufficient regard, i.e. the content 
of its criminal prohibitions, will still be somewhat vague, but that is one reason why the 
application of the criminal law in a particular case is sometimes a matter of judgment 
                                                        
19 To be clear, as I employ it here the phrase ‘appropriate or sufficient regard’ refers to the 
reasons agents take themselves to have to interact with or relate to others in certain ways and 
not others.  It is not, then, simply shorthand for conduct in accordance with the law.  For 
discussion of this potential ambiguity, see Kenneth W. Simons, “Retributivism Refined – or Run 
Amok?” (2010) 77 University of Chicago Law Review 551 at 566-8. 
20 See Shoemaker (n 2) 110. 
21 Ibid. 
(by the police and the prosecutor’s office, as well as the judge and/or jury).22  And while 
it is true that the law’s specification of sufficient regard will likely include certain 
arbitrary cut-offs and thresholds, this may simply reflect the fact that morality itself 
contains indeterminacies, and/or the fact that while morality itself is characterized by 
neither indeterminacy nor vagueness we cannot know where precisely its various 
boundaries lie. 
Another way in which the criminal law often serves to improve its subjects’ 
responsiveness to the reasons that apply to them is by settling their (sometimes 
reasonable) disputes over what sufficient regard for one another requires.23  Consider in 
light of this role the criminal law often plays Shoemaker’s second objection to the claim 
that criminal breaches boil down to paying insufficient regard to others’ legally 
protected interests.  He maintains that criminal conduct is compatible with sufficient 
regard, and offers as an illustration that he could “take extremely seriously your 
interests in doing what you want with your property but still steal from you because I 
weigh my own interests as slightly more important than yours.”24  When it is legitimate, 
                                                        
22 Note that for many relationships the law of a modern liberal state provides only an 
incomplete specification of the regard those in the relationship ought to have for one another 
(or, perhaps, it specifies only one of the two or more relationships people have to one another).  
This is so because the modern liberal state generally seeks to ensure only that its subjects enjoy 
the conditions for living a good life, whatever its particulars, not that they succeed in living good 
lives (i.e. that they flourish).  The requirements modern liberal states typically place on parents 
of minors illustrate this point.  Even if a just state should aim to perfect its subjects, to actively 
pursue their success in living good lives, some further argument will be needed to demonstrate 
that the state ought to use the criminal law as part of its attempts to achieve this goal. 
23 Author ------; John Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination,” (1989) 2 Ratio Juris  97; Jeremy Waldron, 
Law and Disagreement (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  For an 
application of this argument to the criminal law, see John Gardner, “Gist of Excuses,” reprinted 
in Offences and Defences (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
24 See Shoemaker (n 2) 110. 
only the law enjoys the authority to determine for its subjects what constitutes 
sufficient regard for one another qua legal subjects.  That is, only the law has the 
standing to determine that sufficient regard for another’s legal property rights in X does 
or does not preclude me from using X in certain ways.  A number of theorists, myself 
among them, argue that in circumstances where people reasonably disagree over what 
constitutes proper regard for one another, but where morality requires adherence to 
common norms, submission by all to the law of a liberal-democratic state itself 
constitutes proper regard for one’s fellow legal subjects.25  Even those who argue that 
the justification for the law’s authority is wholly instrumental maintain that its subjects 
have a duty to obey it in some range of cases in which, substantively, the law deviates 
from what sufficient regard for others actually requires.26  The point, then, is that 
insofar as the law enjoys the right to determine for its subjects what counts as sufficient 
regard for one another, to which correlates a duty on the part of its subjects to obey the 
law, criminal conduct is not compatible with sufficient regard for others’ legally 
protected interests. 
In fact, it may be that we need not posit a given criminal law’s legitimacy (ie 
justified authority) in order to rebut Shoemaker’s second objection to the claim that 
criminal blemishes cannot be a matter of insufficient regard for others’ legally protected 
interests.  Suppose, as some legal theorists maintain, that law necessarily claims the 
                                                        
25 See, e.g., Author, -----; Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority 
and Its Limits (Oxford University Press: New York, 2010); David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A 
Philosophical Framework (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2009); Anna Stilz, Liberal 
Loyalty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
26 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1986). 
authority to determine for its subjects what counts as appropriate regard for one 
another qua legal subjects.  Moreover, it understands itself to be justified in doing so; 
that is, the law necessarily takes itself to enjoy legitimate authority.  Given these 
presuppositions, the criminal law (i.e. agents qua criminal law officials) cannot conceive 
of criminal activity in the absence of a justification defence that is compatible with 
sufficient regard for others’ legally protected interests.  If we take the question at issue 
to be whether criminal blame can be intelligibly understood to be of a piece with moral 
blame - that is, as necessarily undertaken as a response to the meaning of offenders’ 
criminal conduct – then the claim that the criminal law cannot conceive of criminal 
activity that is compatible with sufficient regard suffices to rebut Shoemaker’s 
objection.  Of course, we may think the state acts unjustifiably when it punishes 
someone because it judges her to be morally blameworthy for failing to conform to the 
law’s judgment of what sufficient regard for another requires.  But to conclude that the 
state acts unjustifiably is not to conclude that it acts unintelligibly; that is, to find that it 
is not actually doing what it claims to be doing, namely holding a person responsible for 
her failure to properly regard others. 
Shoemaker also maintains that certain criminal violations involve no disregard 
for others’ legally protected interests, and offers tax fraud as an example.  Yet subjects 
of a given legal order, or at least the citizens of a legitimate state, surely have an 
interest in others contributing their fair share to the state’s operation.27  Where the 
                                                        
27 For a defense of this claim, see author, -----.  Note that the claim that the burden involved in 
creating and maintaining a (legitimate) state should be distributed fairly is distinct from any 
state is a legitimate one, and so its law possesses legitimate authority, tax law serves to 
specify in part what counts as a fair share of the collective burden involved in 
maintaining the state.28  At a minimum, tax fraud typically constitutes a form of free 
riding – the taking advantage of others’ good faith sacrifices (ie their compliance with 
the law) – and so comprises a failure of proper regard for the legally protected interests 
of others (or at least other citizens).29 
The three criticisms canvased thus far are but a prelude to Shoemaker’s “main 
worry” with the idea that criminal offenses boil down to paying insufficient regard to 
others’ legally protected interests.  That objection goes as follows:  
To punish for insufficient regard for the interests of others is, at the end 
of the day, just to require sufficient regard, that is, to make it part of the 
criminal code that citizens must pay attention to a certain class of 
reasons, at least when they are considering criminal breaches.  This 
would be an outrageous demand, however.  It can be no legitimate 
business of the state what actual attitude we have toward one another in 
interacting; rather, its demands for our interactions cannot go beyond 
                                                        
particular argument establishing who has a duty to bear a fair share of this burden, and why 
they have a duty to do so. 
28 The same conclusion may hold for some incomplete range of a state’s laws even when it is 
illegitimate and seriously unjust.  For an argument to that effect, see Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts 
of Law and Morality (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987). 
29 Shoemaker maintains elsewhere that the duties of the criminal law are non-directed, a view 
clearly at odds with the position I set out in the text.  See: 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2011/05/scanlon-on-blame-part-2-criminal-blame.html.  
Since his discussion of that claim is informal and not part of the paper to which I am responding, 
I will not address those remarks here (though I note that several other contributors to the on-
line discussion respond to Shoemaker’s claim along similar lines to the argument I make in the 
main text). 
requiring that we behave toward one another as if we had sufficient 
regard.  It is only our failing to act in this way that provides legitimate 
targets for state punishment.30   
Shoemaker offers here a reductio ad absurdum argument against the claim that criminal 
blame is a response to the meaning of an offender’s criminal breach.  Surely it would be 
outrageous for the (just, liberal) state to punish a person who conformed to the law 
simply because she did so, say, only because she thought that acting as the law required 
would impress others.  Yet the view that treats criminal blame as a species of moral 
blame does appear to entail that a legitimate state ought to punish those responsible 
for mere bad-attitude crimes, as I will call conformity to the law in the absence of 
proper regard for others’ legally protected interests.31  Therefore we ought to reject the 
view that criminal blame is a response to moral blameworthiness, which is a function of 
the offender’s reasons for acting as she did.  Instead, we ought to follow Shoemaker and 
construe criminal blame as a response to criminal impermissibility, regardless of its 
meaning. 
                                                        
30 See Shoemaker (n 2) 17. 
31 As I noted in the first section of this paper, I follow Scanlon in understanding an agent’s 
attitude to others to be constituted by her responsiveness to the norms that specify the 
relationship she stands in to those others.  An agent has a bad attitude in the relevant sense if 
she culpably fails to advert to those standards; i.e. if she culpably fails to treat them as reasons 
for action (or, as I explain below, is culpable for not being disposed to do so in the absence of 
other reasons to act as those standards require).  In the case of crime, the relevant standards 
are the criminal laws that govern the relationship of agents qua subjects of a common criminal 
law.  Hence mere bad-attitude crimes.   
Someone might contend that punishment for mere bad-attitude crimes is ruled out by the fact 
(supposing it is one) that crime requires an actus reus.  But the issue raised in the text might 
simply be rephrased as the question of whether a legitimate state should have a category of 
crimes whose definitions do not include an act component. 
 While it may well be outrageous to design a criminal law and implement a 
criminal-justice system that aims to punish people for mere bad-attitude crimes, the 
conclusion that we ought to do so does not follow necessarily from the view that those 
who conform to legitimate law while culpably disregarding their duty to do so are 
punishment-worthy.  Rather, we must distinguish two claims Shoemaker runs together.  
The first concerns what the criminal law may justly demand of its subjects, while the 
second concerns what the criminal law may justly do to those who fail to meet its 
demands.  An account of what the criminal law may justly demand of its subjects will tell 
us when its subjects warrant blame; that is, when they are an appropriate target of a 
judgment of blameworthiness.  An account of what the criminal law may justly do to 
those who fail to meet its demands will tell us what sort of blaming-responses the state 
ought to adopt when addressing these individuals.  Consider, then, the question of what 
the state may justly demand from its subjects.  Is it really outrageous for the state to 
demand that its subjects treat the fact that the law prohibits them from performing 
tokens of act-type A – e.g. assault or dumping toxic waste in a river – as a sufficient 
reason not to A?  I expand on this gloss on what sufficient regard for others’ legally 
protected interests involves below.  Here I simply wish to point out what follows if we 
take the criminal law to demand that its subjects have sufficient or proper regard for 
others.  A person who fails to acknowledge that legitimate criminal prohibitions as such 
provide her with a sufficient reason to refrain from treating others in the manner 
specified by those prohibitions is a proper target for a judgment of moral 
blameworthiness.  Suppose we know with absolute certainty that a person refrained 
from doing what the law considers to be assault, or dumping what the law determines 
to be an unacceptable amount of toxic waste in a river, only because she feared being 
punished for doing so.  This person, I contend, reveals an attitude that impairs her 
relationship to others qua subjects of a common legal regime, which on Scanlon’s 
account just is the content of a judgment of blameworthiness.  Both those individuals 
whose interests as spelled out in the law she failed to take as reasons for action and 
perhaps also the members of the political community that organizes itself according to 
the law in question may justifiably feel aggrieved by this agent’s disregard for the law’s 
demand that she act with proper regard for other’s legally protected interests.32  
Some clarification of what it means to say that the criminal law (of a liberal, 
modern state) requires that its subjects have proper regard for others’ legally protected 
interests may lend further credence to the claim that the state does not act 
outrageously in demanding this from those it rules.  As I noted previously, the law 
necessarily claims authority over those within its jurisdiction.  Suppose the criminal law 
prohibits them from performing tokens of act-type A; say, again, assault or dumping 
toxic waste.  In doing so, the law maintains that its subjects ought to take this criminal 
prohibition as a sufficient reason to forbear from performing tokens of A.33  The law 
does not demand that its prohibitions serve as its subjects’ only operative reason, by 
                                                        
32 Moreover, at least some blaming-responses to this individual seem unproblematic (at least 
generally), including feelings of anger, resentment, or indignation toward her, and revisions to 
one’s willingness to trust her to abide by the law, or perhaps even to take others’ interests in 
bodily integrity, property, etc., as providing any sort of reason for action. 
33 More precisely, I argue elsewhere that the duty correlative to law’s legitimate authority is 
disjunctive; either obey or perform an act of suitably constrained civil disobedience.  See Author, 
-----. 
which I mean a consideration reflection upon which actually moves the agent to act.  
Rather, all the law requires is that its subjects be disposed to do so; that they be such 
that the thought ‘the law prohibits A’ would motivate them to forbear from performing 
tokens of A even in the absence of any other reasons they may have to forbear from 
performing tokens of A.  Of course, in a society subject to a legitimate, moderately just, 
and effective criminal law, individuals will often have multiple sufficient reasons to 
forbear from performing tokens of A, including the law’s authority over them, one or 
more independent moral reasons (eg the immorality of assault), and prudential 
considerations (eg the expected disutility of legal punishment for performing tokens of 
A).  Each of these reasons may suffice on its own to move an individual to do that which 
the law would have her do, which is one explanation for why it may sometimes be 
difficult for us to know from a person’s behaviour whether she genuinely has regard for 
our legally protected interests.  However, as long as a person takes, or in the absence of 
other reasons would take, the illegality of doing so to provide her with a sufficient 
reason for acting accordingly, she acts with proper regard for others’ legally protected 
interests.34 
 Consider a person who conforms to the criminal prohibition on performing 
tokens of A only because he fears he will be punished if he does so.  This person fails to 
act with proper regard for others’ legally protected interests because he does not take 
the law’s prohibition on, say, assault to provide him with a reason to refrain from 
                                                        
34 Clearly this claim has implications for the complexity that may be built into a criminal code if it 
is to be legitimate, as well as for the justifiability of a mistake of law defense, but space does not 
permit me to explore them here. 
assaulting others.  Indeed, not only does he disregard others’ legal interests (e.g. the 
law’s specification of their interest in bodily integrity), he disregards their interests per 
se (e.g. their moral interest in bodily integrity).  In the bloodless language of analytic 
philosophy, this person takes the fact that his assaulting another would set back the 
latter’s interest in bodily integrity to provide him with no reason for action at all; he has 
no regard for the other.  Consider now a person who conforms to the criminal 
prohibition on performing tokens of A only to the extent it overlaps with her own moral 
judgment of what constitutes assault, or perhaps her own judgment of when assault is 
justifiable on grounds of self-defence or necessity.  If the law enjoys authority over this 
person on either instrumental or non-instrumental grounds, or both, then she too acts 
with improper regard for others’ legally protected interests.35  She ought to defer to the 
law’s judgment regarding what counts as assault, or justifiable self-defence, and when 
she fails to do so by not taking the law to provide her with a sufficient reason for action, 
she displays an attitude that impairs her relationship to all of the other subjects of the 
law as such.  Though less reprehensible than a person motivated to conform to the 
criminal law only by fear of punishment, the moralist still warrants blame (though how 
much, and what sort of blaming response, depends on further details I will not attempt 
to fill in here).  Contra Shoemaker, then, it is not enough that one act as if one has 
proper regard for others’ legally protected interests; rather, one must genuinely have 
                                                        
35 The grounds for the law’s authority are instrumental if acknowledging the law’s authority is 
merely a means to treating others morally, and non-instrumental instrumental if acknowledging 
the law’s authority constitutes treating others morally. 
proper regard for others, though doing so does not require that one only be motivated 
in every, or any, case by the thought that the law requires one to act thus and so.   
In one respect the conclusions drawn in the preceding paragraph are too broad; 
moral blameworthiness attaches only to agents who culpably fail to advert, or to be 
disposed to advert, to legitimate criminal prohibitions.  Moreover, the conditional 
nature of the claim bears emphasizing: an agent’s failure to recognize the law’s 
authority is morally blameworthy only if the law actually enjoys the authority it claims 
over her.  If an agent has no duty to defer to the law’s judgment regarding what she 
ought to do, then in paying no mind to the legality of her actions per se she does not fail 
to respond appropriately to the norms that specify or define her relationship to 
others.36  On the instrumental account law’s legitimacy may be, and almost certainly will 
be, piecemeal.  Some laws will be legitimate only vis-à-vis certain legal subjects, and 
some of the legal system’s laws may lack authority over any agent within its jurisdiction.  
And while non-instrumental justifications of law’s legitimacy typically entail a general 
and universal duty to obey the law, they also treat respect for various rights as a 
condition for law’s legitimate authority.  Therefore in assessing the claim that an agent 
is blameworthy (punishment-worthy) merely for her failure to advert to a criminal 
prohibition we must be sure to focus on cases in which we think the law – the legal 
system or a particular norm – legitimate.  But if, as I suggested above, a legitimate 
                                                        
36 But does the law not specify people’s relationship to one another qua legal subjects regardless 
of its legitimacy?  Factually, yes, but not normatively, and the judgment that a person is 
blameworthy for her failure to advert to the criminal law is a normative judgment; i.e. a 
judgment regarding the reasons a person actually has to act thus and so. 
criminal code rightfully renders more determinate norms that structure various 
relationships people bear to one another, and resolves reasonable disagreements 
regarding the content of those norms even where they are not (believed to be) 
indeterminate, then why think it is outrageous for the criminal law to demand that 
people pay attention to the reasons it provides them?  Perhaps it is outrageous for the 
state (a particular state, or any state) to demand that its subjects defer to its judgment 
on these matters, but that claim target’s law’s legitimacy, not the claim that given law’s 
legitimacy agents are punishment-worthy even for mere bad-attitude crimes. 
The case of an agent who culpably fails to treat a legitimate criminal prohibition 
as a reason for him not to perform the prohibited act seems analogous to one in which 
Alf promises Betty that he will perform some task as she directs but then culpably fails 
to treat her directives as reasons for action.  Even if Alf happens to act as Betty would 
have him act, in deliberating as he does he manifests a kind of contempt or disrespect 
for her and the relationship between them constituted by his promise.  Betty has a claim 
not simply to his conduct but to his deliberating in a particular way, and Alf is 
blameworthy for his failure to do so.  The same is true in the case of legitimate law.  
Either the political community or the particular agents who are more likely to enjoy 
moral treatment as a result of an agent’s deference to the law, or both, have a claim to 
her deliberating or being disposed to deliberate in a particular manner, namely one that 
treats the law as providing her with a reason for action.37  Even if the agent in question 
                                                        
37 Note that analogy relies on the deference one agent owes another when deliberating, not the 
claim, mistaken in my view, that law’s legitimacy depends on an agent having promised to obey 
it. 
performs the act the law would have her perform, those with a claim to her obedience 
to the law would be justified in feeling aggrieved by her (perhaps implicit) contempt for 
their claim.   
I conclude, then, that there is nothing outrageous or absurd about the law 
demanding that its subjects act with sufficient regard for others’ legally protected 
interests, at least not if the law enjoys legitimate authority and we understand proper 
regard as I spelled it out above.   Those who fail to properly regard others’ legally 
protected interests are punishment-worthy; they deserve, in Scanlon’s’ terms, the 
community’s modification of its relationship to them, and the modification that is called 
for in virtue of the impairment to that relationship is properly characterized as 
punishment.  However, it does not follow necessarily from a person being punishment-
worthy that the state ought to be empowered to punish him.38  To the contrary, I submit 
that there are several considerations that together provide support for a norm severely 
limiting or even outright prohibiting the state from punishing mere bad-attitude crimes, 
ie behaviour in conformity to the criminal law performed without proper regard for 
others’ legally protected interests.  The first consideration in favour of such a norm is 
the epistemic challenge of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular 
individual who has not behaved in a way that violates the criminal law nevertheless 
lacks an attitude of proper regard for others’ legally protected interests.  Note that 
doing so will require more than simply proving that what motivated this person’s 
conformity to law was something other than the fact that the law required the conduct 
                                                        
38 See Moore (n 2) 172-4, 186-7. 
in question.  What would be needed is proof of a counterfactual – that in the absence of 
considerations other than her legal obligation (eg fear of punishment) she would not 
have acted as the law requires.39  A second justification for the norm in question can be 
found in the practical challenge of designing and operating a criminal justice system that 
punishes people who have only committed mere bad-attitude crimes without a resulting 
level of corruption and abuse that produces even more disregard for others’ legally 
protected interests than occurs under a criminal justice system that punishes only those 
who perform criminal acts.  Furthermore, given the many uses to which the state might 
put its resources, and the many uses to which its subjects might put their resources 
other than supporting the state, there may well be a compelling case against the state 
even investigating mere bad-attitude crimes, let alone prosecuting them.  In my view, 
the considerations enumerated here constitute a weighty presumption against 
empowering the state to punish mere bad-attitude crimes.  Of course, unlike a 
principled argument against punishming such crimes a presumption against doing so 
may be defeated, but that is a conclusion I happily embrace.  The contempt a person 
who culpably ignores legitimate law displays toward those with a claim to her deference 
                                                        
39 Suppose a person were to confess to a bad-attitude crime.  Should he or she be punished?  I 
am open to the possibility that we should design our criminal justice institutions to punish such 
a person; that is, I do not take this possible implication of my view to constitute a reductio ad 
absurdum argument against it.  However, the other considerations adumbrated in the text 
against empowering a state to punish mere bad-attitude criminals may warrant the conclusion 
that, all things considered, we should not do so. 
to it warrants blame, and in particular the kind of blaming response constituted by just 
punishment.40  
 For the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs, I conclude that Shoemaker’s 
reductio argument against the insufficient or improper regard account of criminal 
wrongdoing fails.  It follows, therefore, that the reductio argument does not provide a 
reason to think that moral and criminal blame differ fundamentally in part because the 
former can attach to permissible acts while the latter cannot.  Rather, qua legal subjects 
agents are morally blameworthy for indefensible failures to conform to the law for the 
right reasons.  The justification, where there is one, for not employing criminal law 
mechanisms to blame them for their conduct involve practical limitations on our ability 
to do so well, not an in principle prohibition on the political community requiring that its 
members treat one another with due regard, as specified by its criminal law.  
I have sought in this section to defend the claim that violations of the criminal 
law constitute failures of proper regard for others’ legally protected interests.  Together 
with the arguments in the previous section rebutting Shoemaker’s claim that criminal 
blame is entirely a response to impermissibility, this defence provides a plausible case 
for the view that legal punishment should be and sometimes is a response to an agent’s 
moral blameworthiness.  In the final section of this paper I criticize Shoemaker’s view 
that what distinguishes the interpersonal and criminal realms are two different 
conceptions of blame grounded in two different functions.  Instead, I trace the 
                                                        
40 I touch briefly on the nature of just punishment and its connection with blame in the next 
section. 
difference in how we respond to blameworthy wrongdoing to the degree to which we 
employ responses other than blame, and particularly conditional threats, in an effort to 
move others to conform to the norms that define or specify relationships in these two 
realms. 
III 
Having argued that criminal blame differs fundamentally from moral blame, 
Shoemaker traces the difference between them to the distinct function each serves.  
Whereas the fundamental aim of criminal blame, or punishment, is the imposition of a 
sanction, the expression of moral blame serves essentially to communicate the basic 
moral demand for proper regard.41  This difference in the fundamental aims of criminal 
and moral blame has repercussions for the relationship that blamer and blamed stand in 
to one another.  Punishment, Shoemaker contends, occurs only within an asymmetrical 
relationship, one in which the blamer enjoys authority over the blamed.  Though he 
argues for this claim by appeal to paradigm cases of punishment, the point is actually a 
conceptual one.  A necessary condition for A’s imposition of a burden on B counting as 
an instance of punishment is that A claim the authority to impose those sanctions (or, 
perhaps more accurately, some combination of Hohfeldian power-rights and liberty-
rights that together entitle A to impose some burden on B).  Moral blame, in contrast, 
occurs only within interpersonal moral relationships characterized by equal moral 
standing, where neither party enjoys the requisite authority to punish the other.  
Indeed, Shoemaker maintains: ‘punishment is no legitimate part of blame between 
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moral equals.’42  In short, criminal and moral blame serve different functions, in virtue 
of which those who engage in these respective forms of blaming stand in different 
relationships to those they blame. 
Not surprisingly, I think this diagnosis mistaken.  Shoemaker confuses a claim 
regarding the nature of punishment (what makes a particular act an instance of 
punishment) with a claim regarding its proper function (the purpose or purposes that 
justify punishment) and/or a claim regarding its actual function (the purposes for which 
people actually punish, not all of which overlap with punishment’s proper function).  
This confusion can be brought out by considering Shoemaker’s remarks on active blame, 
understood as expressions of anger at another in response to a judgment that he or she 
is blameworthy.43  In order to qualify as blame, such expressions must communicate the 
blamer’s demand for proper regard from the blamed.  Absent this aim, no expression of 
anger counts as an instance of active blame.  The proper function of active blame, I 
suggest, is to call for or initiate a dialogue aimed at repairing the damage done to the 
relationship between blamer and blamed.  One person’s active blame of another is 
proper or justifiable when she seeks to call the latter’s attention to his lack of proper 
regard for her, ie his failure to respond appropriately to reasons for treating her in 
certain ways that he has in virtue of standing in a certain relationship to her.  As 
Shoemaker notes, however, active blame can be used for other purposes as well, such 
as causing the blamed agent to suffer or undermining his confidence.  Moreover, the 
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target of active blame may suffer these consequences even when the blamer does not 
intend them.   
Punishment is subject to a similar analysis.  While punishment necessarily 
involves one agent’s imposition of a burden or sanction on another, this tells us nothing 
about the function of punishment; that is, why people ought to and/or do punish.  One 
proper function of legal punishment, I contend, is the communication of blame.  
Punishment plays an important part in the moral dialogue between the offender, her 
victim, and the political community; it communicates the political community’s 
condemnation of the convicted person’s criminal conduct and provides the criminal with 
a publicly recognized form of penance.44  Though necessary for proper (or just) 
punishment, the communication of blame may not be the only function legal 
punishment properly serves; in particular, I argue elsewhere that considerations of 
deterrence may also figure in a calculation of the appropriate amount or type of 
punishment.45  Moreover, legal punishment is but a part of a larger practice of 
responding to blameworthy wrongdoing, one that is best understood and justified in 
part by appeal to the account of justifiable active blame sketched above.  And of course 
                                                        
44 See Duff (n 2). 
45 See fn. 7.  Given the claim that agents are morally blameworthy (or punishment-worthy) if 
they would not conform to the law but for fear of being punished, the claim that considerations 
of deterrence may sometimes figure in the justification for punishment entails that the state 
may sometimes incite blameworthy conduct.  This may be problematic if the threat of 
punishment leads to an agent’s prudential reason for conforming to the law blinding him to his 
duty to obey the law, where he would have acted on the latter reason had the punishment 
attached to committing the crime in question been less.   It does not strike me as problematic, 
however, if it induces conformity to the law on the part of an agent who would otherwise have 
violated it.  While this agent will still be morally blameworthy (or punishment-worthy), he will be 
less blameworthy than he would have been had he violated the law. 
legal punishment can, and all too frequently does, serve ends that are not part of its 
proper function, such as preserving one group’s rule over another or garnering 
officeholders a reputation as tough on crime that they can use to gain election to higher 
office.  What this analysis reveals is that, contra Shoemaker, the function or rationale for 
punishment is not the imposition of sanctions; rather, the imposition of sanctions is part 
of what makes one agent’s treatment of another punishment, while the function or 
rationale is whatever end or ends at which the (practice of) punishment in question 
aims, or ought to aim.   
Shoemaker argues that punishment need not communicate blame, and that 
active blame need not involve the imposition of a sanction or suffering on the blamed.  I 
agree: punishment is not essentially a blaming response, nor is a blaming response 
essentially punitive.  This observation does not warrant postulating the existence of two 
different conceptions of blame, however.  Rather, it highlights the fact that punishment, 
like the expression of anger, can serve multiple ends.  The interesting questions here do 
not concern the concept of blame, of which there is only one, but the justifiability of 
punishment as a means for expressing blame, particularly given what I maintain is 
blame’s proper function.  I have planted my flag on this question, but of course that 
position stands in need of defence from the criticisms of both pure deterrence theorists 
on the one hand and advocates of restorative justice on the other.  Space does not 
permit me to take up that task here.  Instead, I close by offering an alternative to 
Shoemaker’s explanation for the apparent differences we observe in the practice of 
blaming in the interpersonal and criminal realms. 
One agent’s justifiable active blame of another involves a good faith attempt to 
engage the latter in a moral dialogue regarding a (possibly only apparent) failure of 
proper regard.  Active blame, then, engages its target as a moral agent, one able to 
respond appropriately to moral reasons, including reasons to repair past (blameworthy) 
wrongs as well as reasons to forbear from present and future (blameworthy) 
wrongdoing.  In contrast, deterrence, or a conditional threat, engages its target as a 
prudential agent, one able to respond appropriately to prudential reasons.  In punishing 
someone simply to deter her (and others) from doing A, the punisher makes no effort, 
and does not care, whether those he threatens are thereby brought to recognize the 
reason(s) they have to forbear from acts of type A independent of the fact that 
performing them will result in punishment.  Though both active blame and conditional 
threats involve engaging with the target’s practical reason, active blame (at least when 
justified) is a component of a dialogue between moral equals, whereas conditional 
threats are a component of bargaining between rational agents on the basis of their 
relative power over one another.   
I submit that one important difference we often observe between the criminal 
and interpersonal moral realms concerns the degree to which parties in the 
relationships in question can and do rely upon conditional threats to garner conformity 
to the norms that define the relationships in question.  Shoemaker’s remark regarding 
the place of punishment in relationships between moral equals suggests that he might 
reject this claim on the grounds that conditional threats have no place in interpersonal 
relationships.  That may be true of the ideal form of various interpersonal relationships, 
but it does not seem true to reality.  Rather, even in interpersonal relationships we 
sometimes use threats to motivate our friends, family, colleagues, etc., to conform to 
(what we take to be) our legitimate expectations of them.  Typically we do so when we 
fear our attempts to reason with them, including actively blaming them, will not suffice 
to serve this end.  Moreover, we often (though perhaps not often enough) follow up on 
those threats with renewed efforts to engage the others in the relationship in a dialogue 
regarding what each can legitimately demand as a matter of proper regard from the 
other.  I suggest that the same conclusions hold in the criminal realm.  However, in any 
relationship the use of conditional threats to motivate others to conform to the norms 
that define it will strain that relationship because it constitutes one agent’s attempt to 
impose his or her will on the others, and this agent’s stance toward the others is 
incompatible with respect for them as moral equals.46  Moreover, the employment of 
threats is ultimately antithetical to the trust that is essential to any valuable 
relationship; the more those in a given relationship rely on it the more they damage the 
relationship (and its prospects for repair or improvement).  These conclusions, too, hold 
just as much for the relationship between subjects of a common legal order as they do 
for the relationship between friends, colleagues, and family members.  If correct, these 
observations substantiate Shoemaker’s sense that the practice of blaming in the 
interpersonal realm frequently differs from the practice of blaming in the criminal realm 
(ie punishment) without postulating any essential difference between them. 
                                                        
46 Thus there may be a kernel of truth in Shoemaker’s observation that punishment is no 
legitimate part of blame between moral equals, namely if deterrence provides the sole rationale 
for a particular instance of punishment. 
* * * 
 When we blame someone, we respond to what her reasons for acting as she did 
say about how she values something; eg another person, or the natural environment.  
Specifically, we modify our relationship to her in a manner we deem to be appropriate 
in light of her failure to respond appropriately to reasons we believe she has in virtue of 
a normative relationship she stands in to that thing.  Contra Shoemaker, I have argued 
that so understood moral blame plays a necessary (if not necessarily exclusive) part in 
both the justification of legal punishment and a plausible rational reconstruction of 
many existing criminal law practices.  While practical considerations may often justify 
limiting the scope of criminal blame to conduct in violation of the criminal law, and 
conditional threats may justifiably play a larger role in regulating the interactions of 
people qua legal subjects than it does in more intimate relationships, neither of these 
facts undermine the claim that criminal blame is of a piece with moral blame.  The 
retributivist dream lives on.  
 
